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Abstract 
This paper examines the relevance and effectiveness of a charity accountability monitoring 
program in Scotland. The Scottish charity sector is vibrant and growing but the regulatory 
regime is in flux. Drawing upon a novel panel dataset of 21,322 observations on 5,124 
organizations for the period 2007-2013, this study examines charity accountability from the 
perspective of the regulator and analyzes its attempts to encourage acceptable norms and 
practices in the sector. The results reveal that a majority of these charities trigger 
accountability concerns and a minority do so persistently; however, this study finds no link 
between these concerns and negative organizational outcomes such as public complaints, 
regulatory intervention or charity dissolution. The paper suggests that Scotland’s regulatory 
body should collaborate with the charity sector to reconsider the program’s intended impact 
and priorities, and reflects on alternative indicators of accountability. 
Keywords: performance accountability, nonprofit regulation, public confidence, charity 
accountability, financial accountability 
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Introduction 
Concerns have long been raised about the accountability of charitable organizations, 
particularly the adequacy of current reporting and oversight mechanisms (Acar, Guo & Yang, 
2008; Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Saxton & Guo, 2011). Among the panoply of concerns, 
various stakeholders have questioned the amount spent by these organizations on their 
charitable activities, the provision of private benefit to trustees and senior management, and 
the manner in which they raise their funds (Charity Commission, 2016). These misgivings are 
particularly salient in an era of increasing public scrutiny and accountability of institutions in 
general (Power, 2009; Rothstein, Huber & Gaskell, 2006). Consequently, charities and those 
tasked with their oversight are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their legitimacy and 
sustain and enhance public confidence in the sector.  
In response to calls for greater accountability “there have been several recent initiatives, both 
regulatory and voluntary, to encourage and promote UK charity accountability 
(accountability being the requirement to be answerable for one’s conduct and responsibilities) 
through information communication.” (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013a, pp. 946) In Scotland, 
the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) now publishes links to charity accounts 
on their website and organizations are required to contact OSCR regarding what are known as 
‘notifiable events’ (e.g. instances of theft or fraud). OSCR also implements a program of 
accountability aimed at unearthing potential vulnerabilities in the sector. Examining this 
program can help address some theoretical and empirical gaps in our understanding of charity 
accountability: how is accountability conceptualised and operationalised by those overseeing 
the sector? What factors account for the triggering of accountability concerns? How 
successful are regulatory attempts at promoting accountability? In this article, I answer these 
questions in reporting the results of the first systematic, UK study of a regulatory program 
aimed at monitoring charity accountability. The paper is structured as follows. The charity 
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accountability and regulation literatures are synthesised to provide a conceptual framework 
for the research topic. This is followed by a description of the Scottish charity sector and 
efforts to monitor accountability concerns. A delineation of the data and methods is then 
provided, followed by the presentation of empirical results. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
Literature 
Despite their public benefit requirement and production of beneficial externalities, “in recent 
years nonprofit organizations are required to prove that their public interest orientation still 
remains the case.” (Valentinov, 2011, pp. 32) It is often argued that the continued success of 
the charity sector depends not only on its economic and social activities but also on its ability 
to demonstrate accountability and transparency, which in turn can protect and enhance public 
confidence (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013b; Cordery & Morgan, 2013; Keating & Frumkin, 
2003; Morgan, 2012). Bovens (2007, pp. 452) defines accountability as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct; 
the forum can pose questions; pass judgment; and the actor may face consequences.” 
Valentinov (2011) contends that charity accountability is contingent on addressing two major 
questions: accountability to whom; and accountability for what. With respect to the second 
question, Taylor and Rosair (2000), Behn (2001), Brody (2002), Goodin (2003), and 
Connolly and Hyndman (2004) have made substantial contributions, with their work 
converging on the need for charities to discharge two dimensions of accountability: fiduciary 
and performance. Traditionally, charities have discharged accountability through the 
disclosure of financial information and efficiency metrics in annual accounts and reports 
submitted to the relevant oversight body. However, there are increasing calls for these 
organizations to discharge accountability through the provision of alternative, non-financial 
narratives of performance (Britton, 2008; Connolly, Hyndman & McConville, 2013; Keating 
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& Frumkin, 2003; Philips, 2013). Considerable research has also been conducted on to whom 
charities should be accountable. Prominent in the literature is work examining the manner 
and content of accountability to beneficiaries (e.g. Wellens & Jegers, 2016) and the public 
(e.g. Morgan & Fletcher, 2013), particularly in the context of voluntary disclosures of 
financial information (e.g. Saxton, Kuo & Ho, 2012). 
The growth and importance of the charity sector globally in recent years, particularly in terms 
of public service provision, has placed a spotlight on the role and effectiveness of regulation 
(Johnson, Jenkinson, Kendall, Bradshaw & Blackmore 1998; Rutherford, 2015). Regulators 
have an important role to play in promoting transparency and accountability, which in turn 
may have tangible reputational benefits for the sector (Cordery & Morgan, 2013; see also 
Philips, 2013; Thompson & Williams, 2014). There are convincing rationales for the 
regulation of charities: the need to address perceived or actual transparency issues by 
reducing information asymmetry in the sector; the privileged tax exempt status of charities; 
the importance of public confidence to the health of the sector; the desire for competition 
among charities through transparency and open data initiatives; and to ensure an appropriate 
distribution of scarce resources (Cordery, 2013). Not all of the above rationales are present in 
every regulatory regime but the importance of protecting and facilitating public confidence in 
the sector cannot be overstated (Cordery & Morgan, 2013). One of the primary mechanisms 
through which regulators oversee the sector, and thus achieve their primary aim of protecting 
public confidence, is through the requirement of good accounting and reporting practices by 
charities (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; Reheul, Van Caneghem & Verbruggen, 2014). 
The use of regulation to encourage and enhance accountability in the charity sector is not 
without consequences, intended or otherwise (Irvin, 2005). Corry (2010, pp.11) argues that 
charities cannot be regulated without imposing some cost on organizations and the sector as a 
whole: “Unlike the state and the market economy, it is something that can scarcely be 
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subjected to detailed planning or regulated without it losing some of its…qualities such as 
voluntary participation, value-based motivation, and independence from more 
institutionalized power structures.” In his analysis of philanthropic foundations in the US, 
Frumkin (1998) argues that a regulatory development (Tax Reform Act of 1969) led to the 
emergence of highly staffed bureaucratic foundations, which in turn had two significant 
consequences for the sector: increased isomorphism and the dominance of a short-term, 
targeted form of funding. Neely (2011, pp. 123) also examined the effectiveness of nonprofit 
regulation in the US and found that the Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) of 2004 had the “effect 
of increasing accounting fees, while providing limited improvement in financial reporting 
quality in the first year of implementing the Act.” Hyndman and McDonnell (2009; see also 
Cordery, 2013) posit that charities may become more accountable to the regulator at the 
expense of their donors and beneficiaries. Onerous reporting requirements can force charities 
to divert time and resources away from achieving objectives (Szper & Prakash, 2011) and 
discourage innovation (Johnson et al., 1998). In order to address these undesirable 
implications there have been calls for a differentiated approach to regulation and the rejection 
of a narrow conceptualization of accountability that privileges external oversight (Cordery, 
Sim & van Zijl, 2015; Ebrahim, 2003). 
Despite the proliferation of credible work in this area, our understanding of the nature, extent, 
determinants and outcomes of accountability concerns is limited (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). 
Contributing to the literature on charity accountability I address three research questions: 
1. What is the nature and extent of accountability concerns in the Scottish charity sector? 
2. What factors account for variation in the triggering of these concerns? 
3. Is there a link between accountability concerns and negative organizational outcomes? 
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To answer these questions I employ factors derived from institutional theory that are common 
in studies of charity accountability to serve as the conceptual framework for the study. 
Organisation size, age, type, strategy and revenue concentration have all been found to be 
associated with variation in the accountability behaviour of charities (Saxton & Guo, 2011; 
Saxton et al., 2012; Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2015). The operationalization of this 
framework is outlined in the Method section of the paper; the next section describes the 
Scottish charity sector and the accountability monitoring program that is the subject of this 
study. 
The Scottish Charity Sector 
In Scotland, a charity is defined (under statute) as an organization that is listed on the Charity 
Register maintained by OSCR; unlike the rest of the UK, all charities are required to register 
with OSCR and thus the Charity Register is a complete accounting of these organizations in 
Scotland. To register, an organization must demonstrate that it passes the charity test: it must 
have only charitable purposes; the organization must or intend to provide some form of 
public benefit; it must not allow its assets to be used for non-charitable purposes; it cannot be 
governed or directed by government Ministers; and it cannot be a political party (Office of 
the Scottish Charity Regulator, n.d). Charities are subject to regulation by OSCR, which was 
established in 2003 as an Executive Agency and took up its full powers when the Charities 
and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 came into force in April 2006. Its 
responsibilities include the following: keep a public register of charities in Scotland; 
determine whether an organization can be a charity; encourage, assist and monitor 
compliance with regulation; identify and investigate apparent misconduct and protect charity 
assets; give advice or make proposals to ministers about charity regulation. The rationale 
underpinning these responsibilities is common to many charity regulatory regimes: protect 
public confidence and trust in the sector. In order to achieve this aim OSCR has shifted 
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towards a risk-based regulatory approach, examining charities “as a whole rather than 
charitable status alone, checking on all the issues we know can threaten charitable assets or a 
charity’s reputation and cause concern to the public” (Office of the Scottish Charity 
Regulator, n.d., pp. 6). Risk-based regulation is commonly defined as a particular strategy or 
set of strategies that regulators use to target their resources at those sites and activities that 
present threats to their ability to achieve their objectives (Black & Baldwin, 2012; see also 
Hutter, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2006; Sparrow, 2000). 
Monitoring Accountability Concerns 
In order to identify and monitor accountability concerns in the sector, OSCR implements a 
financial “exceptions” program that establishes standards and identifies vulnerabilities (e.g. 
errors, transgressions and risks) which then activate closer investigation. This exception 
approach differs from OSCR’s interventionist, enforcement activities in that the focus is on 
establishing standards and identifying vulnerabilities in a charity’s financial profile rather 
than investigating misconduct or noncompliance. The program examines 32 aspects of a 
charity’s financial status that may be indicative of accountability concerns, with a particular 
focus on fundraising, governance and compliance with regulation. The financial exceptions 
are grouped under six headings: large charity or major fundraiser; sudden growth or 
contraction; possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes (including fundraising 
issues); poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability; adequacy of governing board; and 
transactions with trustees (see Table A1 for a detailed list of the exceptions in each group). 
Exceptions are triggered automatically during the submission of a charity’s annual accounts; 
if this occurs the organization is immediately informed and offered the opportunity to provide 
an explanation. OSCR then decides whether this explanation is valid and – in tandem with a 
fuller review of the charity’s accounts and annual report – if the exception requires further 
investigation. The financial exceptions program does not apply to charities with an annual 
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gross income less than £25,000, Registered Social Landlords and Cross Border charities 
(these organizations are primarily subject to regulation by the Scottish Housing Regulator and 
the Charity Commission for England & Wales respectively). 
Method 
To investigate the prevalence, determinants and predictive ability of accountability concerns, 
I utilise administrative panel data derived from OSCR for the period 2007-2013. Charities 
must submit an annual return form and set of financial accounts for each accounting year. 
The dataset utilised for this research is constructed from two sources: financial exceptions 
data and annual returns information. The first data source captures instances where a charity’s 
annual accounts trigger one or more exception codes; the second source contains detailed 
organizational and financial attributes of charities. Table 1 summarises the sample selection 
process. 
[Table 1 here] 
The median organisation in the sample does not receive any income from government 
funding or trading activities, spends £230,391 on conducting its charitable activities and 
£4,200 on governance costs, has £129,909 in unrestricted funds (reserves), and has been in 
existence for 21 years. In contrast the mean charity receives £1,039,762 and £135,133 in 
income from government funding and trading activities respectively, spends £2,044,046 on 
conducting its charitable activities and £17,306 on governance costs, has £2,056,464 in 
reserves, and has been in existence for 31 years. These figures point to a sector that is skewed 
by large, well-established charities that possess greater resources than their peers; the 
heterogeneous nature of the sector is a fact that readers should keep in mind during the 
presentation and discussion of the empirical analysis. 
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Dependent and Independent Variables 
For the descriptive analysis six binary indicator variables are examined (one for each of the 
exception groups: a value of 1 indicates that an observation experienced this exception and 0 
if it did not. Tabulations and sequence analysis techniques are employed to analyse trends 
over time for the exception groups. For the multivariate analysis, two of the exception groups 
are employed as the dependent variables in a logistic regression random effects model: (i) 
possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes and (ii) poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability. This is for statistical reasons as well as substantive: they are the most 
common exception groups and of most concern to the regulator with regards to public 
confidence. For the regression models the reference category of the indicator variables is 
altered slightly: a value of 1 indicates that an observation experienced this exception and 0 
represents an observation that never triggered an exception of any type, and thus the sample 
sizes in the models are reduced. In order to leverage the longitudinal nature of the data, a 
random effects logistic regression model was specified.
1
 
Drawing on the reviewed literature, I operationalise seven independent variables for the 
statistical models: six organizational and one financial (see Table 2). As many of the 
exceptions are derived by computing ratios of numerous financial attributes, it would be 
unwise to include more financial variables for multicollinearity and causal reasons. Though 
theoretical models of the determinants of accountability exist (see Saxton & Guo, 2011; 
Saxton et al., 2012), they seek to explain voluntary disclosure by nonprofits and thus are not 
considered appropriate for this analysis; it is also not possible to employ these models as 
intended due to the absence of appropriate measures in the dataset (e.g. board size). 
[Table 2 here] 
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The sample generated for this research has some limitations. Observations apply only to 
charities that meet a specified income threshold (see Table 1) and thus some occurrences of 
financial exceptions are not included in the analysis: for example, some instances of 
exceptions relating to fundraising and governance in smaller organizations are excluded. 
There are also issues inherent in using charity accounts for research purposes, such as 
missing data, incomparability between organizations due to the adoption of different 
accounting standards, significant lags in reporting, and measurement changes over time 
(Bingham & Walters, 2013; Morgan, 2011). With respect to the topic at hand, this research 
only examines one interorganizational relation – that of the regulator and charity. As Ebrahim 
(2005: pp. 82) cautions: 
Policy discussions about improving accountability through increased oversight may 
be myopic if they rely on and privilege upward, rather than downward and internal, 
means and actors. This is not to say that upward accountability or oversight is 
unnecessary – certainly it plays a crucial and legitimate role, for example, in 
preventing fraudulent use of funds by organizations – but it is only one dimension of 
multiple accountability relationships. 
Results 
61 percent of charities (42 percent of observations) in the sample triggered at least one 
financial exception over the period 2007-2013. For organizations that experienced an 
exception, it is likely that they will trigger more than one over the whole period: the mean 
number of exceptions is 9 (SD 10) and the median is 8. However, charities that do experience 
exceptions tend to trigger only a small number per annum: the mean number of exceptions is 
2 (SD 1) and the median is 1. 
Trends over Time 
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Table 3 displays the distribution of exception groups over time. A possible failure to apply 
funds for charitable purposes is the most common exception group: the majority of the 22 
percent of observations that experienced this exception triggered concerns relating to the cost 
of raising funds and expenditure on charitable activities (codes 5 and 8 respectively). There is 
some evidence of financial vulnerability in the sector, with at least 13 percent of charities in 
any particular year triggering exception codes relating to poor liquidity, low reserves, and 
threats to viability; there is a more even distribution of exception codes in this category, with 
concerns relating to debtors and creditors (codes 13 and 14 respectively) being slightly more 
common than other exceptions. There appears to be no association between each type of 
exception and the year in which it occurred (gamma < 0.1): the proportion of charities 
triggering each exception group does not vary substantially over time or from the average for 
the whole period. The increases for 2012 and 2013 across some of the exception groups are 
accounted for by a change in the denominator (that is, a reduction in the number of 
organizations completing the detailed financial information section of the supplementary 
monitoring form). 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 4 presents the distribution of the number of times a charity experienced each exception 
group, only for those organizations that triggered the respective exception at least once. The 
results suggest that there is some degree of repetition. For instance, twenty percent of 
charities that trigger concerns relating to a possible failure to apply funds for charitable 
purposes do so in four or more years; similar distributions are found for the other exception 
groups besides sudden growth or contraction. 
[Table 4 here] 
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For the sector as a whole it appears that exceptions persist over time. Adopting a repeated 
cross-sectional perspective is limited however, as it does not reveal whether the same 
charities are triggering these exceptions over time. In order to examine persistence and 
transitions I examine only those charities that submitted an annual return for each year 
(n=1,398). Figures 1 and 2 display the results of a sequence analysis for the two most 
common exception groups. To make the sequences clearer, charities that never trigger these 
exception groups are excluded. The figures show that a small proportion of charities 
repeatedly trigger these accountability concerns (about five percent of the sample) – as 
evidenced by a continuous dark line across every time period – and exception sequences are 
somewhat turbulent (i.e. varying between states over time). Examining the transition matrices 
for these exception groups also reveal an element of dependency in the triggering of an 
accountability concern (Table 5). The likeliest transition is dependent on a charity’s current 
exception status: if it has not triggered an exception at time t then it most likely will not 
experience the exception at time t+1 and vice versa. For example, there is a 61 percent 
probability that a charity, having triggered a concern relating to poor liquidity, low reserves 
and threats to viability at time t, will trigger the same exception at time t+1. This is true for 
all groups with the understandable exception of triggering concerns relating to sudden growth 
or contraction, where the likeliest transition is to not experiencing this exception. In 
conclusion, it appears that a small minority of charities repeatedly trigger exceptions and 
there is evidence of path dependency. The posited determinants of triggering accountability 
concerns are modelled in the next section. 
 [Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
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Patterns in Exceptions: Relationship with Covariates 
Before turning to the multivariate results, Tables A2 and A3 in the appendices contain 
descriptive statistics for each of the dependent variables in the analysis. For exceptions 
relating to the possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes, the average charity 
appears to be slightly bigger, younger, more likely to discharge grants, more likely to operate 
overseas and less likely to be a religious organization. For exceptions relating to poor 
liquidity, low reserves and threats to viability, the average charity appears to be slightly 
bigger, younger, and more likely to operate both overseas and locally. The presence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables was examined for each model by 
calculating the variance inflation factors (VIF). For both models, the VIF for each 
independent variable is less than 1.5 and the mean VIF is less than 1.2, below the thresholds 
at which Allison (1999) suggests multicollinearity is problematic. 
I report the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) rather than the log odds as they 
approximate the relative risk of triggering each exception.
2
 This is appropriate not only for 
ease of interpretation but because the absolute chance of triggering an exception is low (i.e. it 
is better to know which charities are more likely relative to their peers). The results of the 
regression models are presented in Table 6. I examine the financial independent variable first. 
For both dependent variables, the odds of triggering an exception are lower for organizations 
with greater revenue diversity, though the effect is only statistically significant in the first 
model. The effect of age is similar across both models: as charities get older their odds of 
triggering these exceptions reduce significantly. This may suggest some form of 
organizational learning whereby charities develop better practices over time across a range of 
domains (e.g. reporting and accounting). The effect of size is also consistent across both 
models: an increase in annual gross income is associated with a significant increase in the 
odds of triggering concerns. This stands in contrast to the interpretation of the effect of age: 
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charities develop over time but they may become exposed to different pressures and 
situations that relate to exceptions as they grow. It also appears that the other independent 
variables matter, though their effect and significance varies across the models. For example, 
grant-making charities have higher odds of triggering exceptions relating to the use of 
charitable assets but lower odds for those relating to financial vulnerability. Finally, the rho 
statistic reveals that a large proportion of the variance of the error term in the models is 
accounted for by unobserved differences between charities. This suggests that the 
idiosyncrasies of these organizations contribute to their likelihood of triggering exceptions. 
[Table 6 here] 
The analysis concludes with an assessment of the association between the exceptions 
program and a suite of negative outcomes in the sector: late submission of annual returns and 
accounts; complaint about the conduct of an organization; regulatory intervention arising as a 
result of a complaint; and removal from the Charity Register. Table 7 below presents the 
higher-order correlations between each exception group and the four outcomes, controlling 
for the independent variables utilised in the regression models. The results show that the 
exception groups are not associated with any of the outcomes, with the correlations below the 
threshold at which they are typically considered weak (0.1). This is especially surprising for 
exceptions relating to sudden growth/contraction or threats to viability, as it is plausible that 
they should be associated with organizational demise. In sum, though accountability concerns 
may be important to monitor in their own right, in general they do not seem to lead to other, 
arguably more serious organizational outcomes. 
[Table 7 here] 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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Monitoring accountability concerns is an acknowledgement of charity law being an 
“incomplete solution to nonprofit governance and the protection of the public interest.” 
(Brody, 2006, pp. 243)  OSCR’s aim of encouraging good practice is laudable and clearly 
grounded in the belief that “accountability as a marker sets the stage for accountability as a 
modifier” (Acar et al., 2008, pp. 13). However, the absence of any statistical association 
between the accountability concerns measured by OSCR and tangible outcomes such as 
dissolution and regulatory intervention raises questions about the effectiveness of this 
monitoring program. In essence, the program’s normative aims appear to lead to symbolic or 
negligible impact on charity behaviour. 
This study contributes to the burgeoning charity accountability literature in a number of 
important ways. First, by describing patterns in the occurrence and persistence of 
accountability concerns the study makes a contribution to the evidence base from the under-
researched UK perspective (Clifford & Mohan, 2016). The proportion of charities triggering 
financial exceptions is consistent across the study period and there is evidence of repetition 
and path dependency also. However, Figures 1 and 2 reveal that there is still a degree of 
variability in the triggering of exceptions and it does not appear that the consistent 
proportions of exceptions over time are fully accounted for by the same group of charities. 
This suggests that the accountability concerns monitored by OSCR are somewhat an inherent 
feature of the sector, at least for the sample of large charities in this study. The multivariate 
work highlights the salience of core institutional factors in understanding the locus of 
accountability concerns in the charity sector. The finding that older charities are less likely to 
trigger accountability concerns while larger organizations are more likely, may be indicative 
of a tension in the development cycle of charities: age brings experience and learning but size 
engenders new and significant challenges with respect to financial reporting and 
performance. Finally, the descriptive and multivariate work combined offer an alternative 
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perspective to the extant literature by focusing on involuntary, performance-related 
information disclosures rather than voluntary disclosure of (primarily) financial information 
(Connolly & Hyndman, 2013a; Connolly et al., 2013; Hyndman, 1990, 1991; Gandia, 2011; 
Gordon, Fischer, Malone & Tower, 2002; Saxton & Guo, 2011; Saxton et al., 2012). 
The results of this analysis also have considerable practical implications for OSCR and other 
institutions operating under the rubric of risk-based regulation. OSCR aims to discharge its 
regulatory function in a progressive, proportionate and preventative manner, and the efficient 
and effective distribution of its resources is critical in achieving this. In light of the evidence 
provided in this study OSCR may need to reflect on the utility of its accountability program. 
It could be argued that the exceptions monitoring program is retrospective, tangentially 
linked to public confidence, and focused on technical compliance with accounting 
requirements and not enough on core concerns such as fundraising, governance and sound 
financial practices. The issue of regulatory burden should also be a consideration for OSCR; 
the absence of a link between the financial exceptions and negative organizational outcomes 
(Table 7) calls into question whether the costs imposed on charities by the need to respond to 
the triggering of a concern are justified. A useful exercise for OSCR would be to re-evaluate 
its own interest, intensity and investment in this program. Improvements to the monitoring 
program could be made by adopting simpler, alternative measures of accountability: ones that 
are at least moderately linked with demise and misconduct (Breen, 2013), and whose effect 
on public confidence is more plausible (e.g. senior management pay).
3
 If the focus is entirely 
on accountability concerns that may impact public confidence, many of these measures could 
be derived from the multitude of surveys exploring public trust in, and issues with, charities 
(see National Council for Voluntary Organizations, 2015 for an overview). Finally, OSCR 
could collaborate with charities themselves to better understand and measure the operational 
vulnerabilities of these organizations. 
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The counter argument is that the effect of the mere existence of this program – whatever its 
capacity to affect behaviour change and prevent negative outcomes – on public confidence in 
the sector should not be discounted; donors, beneficiaries, funders and the public may derive 
reassurance from the activities of OSCR to monitor vulnerabilities and dissuade undesirable 
behaviours. It is plausible that certain exception codes do relate to public confidence and thus 
are worth monitoring: for example, transactions with trustees could constitute excess private 
benefit which would contravene elements of the charity test. It would also be remiss to 
suggest that charities do not derive any utility from the triggering of exceptions: it is plausible 
that some organizations improve their accounting, reporting and financial practices in 
response to an exception being triggered. 
Reflecting on the discussion above, there is a number of fruitful avenues for research in this 
area. There is a dearth of evidence on charities’ understanding of and response to 
accountability concerns (Acar, Guo & Yang, 2012), which could be addressed by a program 
of longitudinal, qualitative research. Research could also focus on regulatory regimes – 
charity or otherwise – that are successful in dissuading undesirable behaviours and preventing 
negative outcomes. Specific to the Scottish context, it would be interesting to investigate 
charities’ prior knowledge of the exceptions, whether tactics are employed to avoid triggering 
these concerns, and any resulting organizational learning or behavioural changes. In the UK, 
the existence of three broadly similar regulatory regimes (Scotland, England and Wales, and 
Northern Ireland) offers the potential for detailed comparative work (e.g. natural 
experiments) to be conducted on the impact of different reporting thresholds and 
requirements on accountability. Finally, alternative data sources – such as the Trustee Annual 
Report (TAR) – could be mined for a wider, more specific suite of independent variables and 
performance-related information.
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Appendices 
[Table A1 here] 
[Table A2 here] 
[Table A3 here] 
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Endnotes 
1. Other possible model specifications include fixed effects and pooled logistic regression. A 
random effects model is chosen over pooled logit as the Hausman test is statistically 
significant (X
2
=69.59***) and due to the size of the rho coefficient; ignoring this level of 
unobserved heterogeneity would lead to incorrect interpretation of model coefficients. A 
fixed effects model is rejected as it excludes time-invariant independent variables that are of 
substantive interest (they are absorbed by the model’s intercept or constant). For example, 
ICNPO category does not vary over time and thus would be omitted in the estimation of a 
fixed effects model, despite interest in exploring whether this variable affects the outcome. 
2. Values greater than one indicate higher odds of the outcome occurring compared to the 
reference category; less than one indicate lower odds; and one represents the same odds. 
3. As part of its targeted regulation approach, OSCR is reviewing the accountability 
monitoring program; though the changes have not been made public, it appears that fewer 
exceptions will be monitored and new ones derived from questions on the amended annual 
return form introduced in April 2016. It is too early to evaluate the impact of these changes 
but fewer, better measures of vulnerability are to be welcomed.
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Tables and Figures 
Table A1. Financial exception codes 
  
Exception code Description 
Large charity or major fundraiser 
1 Total incoming resources are over £10M. 
2 Total donations gifts and legacies received over £1M. 
Sudden growth or contraction 
3 Total incoming resources are over £250,000 and over five times the previous 
year’s. 
4 Total incoming resources previous year were over £250,000 and this year’s are 
under one fifth. 
Possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
5 Cost of generating voluntary funds is over 50% of donations plus legacies. 
6 Cost of trading in order to raise funds exceeds income from trading in order to 
raise funds. 
8 Total resources expended are under 67% of total incoming resources. 
9 Governance costs are over 25% of total resources expended. 
10 “Other” is more than 50% of resources expended. 
Poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
11 Total resources expended are over 150% of total incoming resources. 
12 Negative total net assets. 
13 Debtors more than 30% of total incoming resources. 
14 Creditors payable within one year more than 50% of total resources expended. 
15 Negative net current assets (ie net current liabilities) more than 20% of total 
incoming resources. 
16 Unrestricted fund negative and more than 1% of total incoming resources. 
Fundraising issues (also 5 and 6) 
17 Unauthorised fundraising answered yes. 
Adequacy of governing board 
18 Two or fewer trustees and either total incoming resources over £1M or total net 
assets over £1M. 
19 No trustees normally residing in Scotland. 
Transactions with trustees 
20 Payments to trustees settling outlays greater than £50,000. 
21 Payments to Trustees for professional services to the charity greater than 
£50,000. 
22 Payments to Trustees for professional services greater than 30% of total 
resources expended. 
23 Payments to Trustees for any other work done for the charity is greater than 
£50,000. 
24 Payments to Trustees for any other work done for the charity is over 30% of 
total resources expended. 
25 Payment to Trustees for any other reason over £50,000. 
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26 Payments to Trustees for any other reason over 30% of total resources 
expended. 
27 Payments to trustees for professional services, work done or “other”, and no 
specific authority in constitution. 
28 Money owed by Trustee at any time greater than £5,000. 
29 Sales of properties to Trustees greater than £50,000. 
30 Property gifted to trustee(s) value over £500. 
31 Purchase of properties from Trustees greater than £50,000. 
32 Charity occupied property belonging to a trustee and paid more than £20,000. 
33 Services made available to one or more trustees. 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
  
Sample selection Observations 
  
Initial sample 155,416 (28,093 charities) 
  
   Removal of observations that did not provide a 
detailed financial breakdown in the supplementary 
monitoring form in a particular year – those with 
annual gross income less than £250,000 (£100,000 
prior to 2012) 
129,708 
  
   Removal of observations not included in 
analysis period 
808 
  
   Removal of observations listed as Cross Border 
or Registered Social Landlords 
4,231 
  
Final sample 21,322 (5,124 charities) 
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Table 2. Conceptual framework 
Factor Variable Operationalization 
Financial Concentration Revenue concentration of a charity. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) on a scale 
of 0-1; 0 is more concentrated, 1 is less. 
   
Organizational Size Natural log of annual gross income 
   
 Age Natural log of the number of years a charity 
has existed (most recent annual return year – 
registration year) 
   
 Grant 1 = Disburses grants to other organisations 
0 = Carries out charitable activities itself or a 
combination of functions 
   
 Field International Classification of Non-profit 
Organisations (e.g. Social Services). 
Nominal variable with 12 categories (see 
Mohan & Barnard, 2013 for how these 
categories were assigned) 
   
 Geography Geographical scope of a charity’s operations 
(e.g. Local). 
Nominal variable with 8 categories. 
   
 Form Constitutional form of a charity (e.g. Trust). 
Nominal variable with 9 categories. 
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Table 3. Distribution of financial exceptions 2007-2013 
         
 % of charities 
Type of exception  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
         
Possible failure to 
apply funds for 
charitable 
purposes 
25 22 20 21 21 22 23 22 
         
Poor liquidity, 
low reserves, 
threats to viability 
15 13 14 14 14 16 16 14 
         
Transactions with 
trustees 
10 10 10 10 9 12 10 10 
         
Large charity or 
major fundraiser 
6 6 6 6 6 13 12 7 
         
Sudden growth or 
contraction 
1 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 
         
Adequacy of 
governing board 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
         
Total 100 
(3,386)       
100  
(3,563) 
100 
(3,491) 
100 
(3,496) 
100 
(3,604) 
100 
(1,872) 
100 
(1,910) 
100 
(21,322) 
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 
100. 
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Table 4. Distribution of the number of instances of exception groups 
       
 % of charities 
Number 
of 
instances 
Large 
charity or 
major 
fundraiser 
Sudden 
growth or 
contraction 
Possible 
failure to 
apply funds 
for 
charitable 
purposes 
Poor 
liquidity, 
low reserves, 
threats to 
viability 
Adequacy 
of 
governing 
board 
Transactions 
with trustees 
       
1 28 83 45 43 57 35 
       
2 10 16 23 23 13 15 
       
3 6 1 13 13 8 8 
       
4 6 - 10 7 9 9 
       
5 7 - 6 6 4 11 
       
6 8 - 2 4 3 9 
       
7 35 - 2 4 7 13 
       
Total 100 
(1,876) 
100 
(336) 
100 
(5,054) 
100 
(3,486) 
100 
(371) 
100 
(2,401) 
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 
100. 
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Table 5. Probability of transitioning to triggering an exception 
       
 Probability of triggering exception at t+1 (%) 
Triggered 
exception 
at t 
Large 
charity or 
major 
fundraiser 
Sudden 
growth or 
contraction 
Possible 
failure to 
apply funds 
for 
charitable 
purposes 
Poor 
liquidity, 
low reserves, 
threats to 
viability 
Adequacy 
of 
governing 
board 
Transactions 
with trustees 
       
No 25 15 26 25 16 23 
       
Yes 89 18 55 61 63 80 
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics for possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
         
 Triggered 
(N=1,807) 
 Not triggered 
(N=2,850) 
 Whole sample 
(N=4,657) 
Variables M SD  M SD  M SD 
         
Size 13.81 1.74  12.76 1.00  13.17 1.43 
         
Age 3.07 .88  3.19 .79  3.14 .83 
         
Concentration .29 .22  .31 .22  .30 .22 
         
Grant .40 .49  .27 .44  .32 .47 
         
Company (%) 52.41 -  54.74 -  53.83 - 
         
Trust (%) 19.37 -  12.07 -  14.90 - 
         
Unincorporated association 
(%) 
17.10 -  25.96 -  22.53 - 
         
Operate widely (%) 16.05 -  26.35 -  22.35 - 
         
Operate locally (%) 23.02 -  26.04 -  24.87 - 
         
Operate overseas (%) 22.75 -  13.02 -  16.81 - 
         
Social services (%) 13.09 -  23.98 -  19.77 - 
         
Religion (%) 18.51 -  22.04 -  20.68 - 
         
Culture & recreation (%) 17.71 -  14.06 -  15.47 - 
         
Education & research (%) 17.49 -  6.76 -  10.90 - 
         
Development & housing (%) 14.00 -  11.43 -  12.43 - 
         
Health (%) 3.60 -  7.23 -  5.83 - 
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Only selected categories from the nominal 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity.  
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics for poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
         
 Triggered 
(N=1,408) 
 Not triggered 
(N=1,632) 
 Whole sample 
(N=3,040) 
Variables M SD  M SD  M SD 
         
Size 13.54 1.51  12.89 1.05  13.19 1.32 
         
Age 3.01 .83  3.09 .77  3.05 .80 
         
Revenue concentration .28 .22  .28 .23  .28 .22 
         
Grant .39 .49  .37 .48  .38 .48 
         
Company (%) 58.10 -  62.25 -  60.33 - 
         
Trust (%) 20.03 -  18.87 -  19.41 - 
         
Unincorporated association 
(%) 
13.99 -  13.48 -  13.72 - 
         
Operate widely (%) 18.82 -  25.98 -  22.66 - 
         
Operate locally (%) 21.16 -  17.40 -  19.14 - 
         
Operate overseas (%) 20.60 -  12.87 -  16.45 - 
         
Social services (%) 12.94 -  17.02 -  15.14 - 
         
Religion (%) 15.29 -  13.69 -  14.43 - 
         
Culture and recreation (%) 22.21 -  20.48 -  21.27 - 
         
Education & research (%) 15.59 -  14.57 -  15.14 - 
         
Development & housing (%) 16.03 -  10.11 -  12.84 - 
         
Health (%) 2.50 -  4.40 -  3.52 - 
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Only selected categories from the nominal 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
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Table 6. Regression models results 
 Possible failure to apply 
funds for charitable 
purposes 
 Poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability 
 Odds ratio SE  Odds ratio SE 
Financial      
     Concentration .30*** .09  .79 .28 
Organizational      
     Size 2.94*** .22  2.34*** .19 
     Age .61*** .07  .62*** .08 
     Grant 1.87** .36  .86 .18 
     Form (base = Company)      
          Trust 2.14** .53  1.93* .52 
          Unincorporated 1.10 .27  2.63** .87 
     Geography (base = Wide)      
          Operate locally 1.91** .45  2.75*** .76 
          Operate overseas 2.04* .59  5.77*** 1.88 
     ICNPO (base = Social)      
          Religion 3.45*** 1.03  1.60 .58 
          Culture & recreation 3.87*** 1.07  1.38 .41 
          Education & research 3.27*** 1.07  .92 .31 
          Development & housing 3.53*** 1.04  3.43*** 1.15 
          Health .77 .29  .39 .20 
Observations 4,522  2,949 
Log-likelihood -2301.03  -1672.65 
LR test (X
2
) 302.47***  161.14*** 
rho .65  .59 
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Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. The reference groups are the largest categories 
for each independent variable. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are 
included for the purpose of brevity. Constant is omitted. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 7. Correlation between accountability concerns and negative outcomes 
     
Exception group Late 
submission 
Complaint Regulatory 
intervention 
Removal 
from Charity 
Register 
     
Large charity or major 
fundraiser 
.03*** .05*** .03*** .06*** 
     
Sudden growth or contraction .02** -.01 .01 -.02*** 
     
Possible failure to apply funds 
for charitable purposes 
.04*** -.01 .01 -.03*** 
     
Poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability 
.05*** -.01 .00 .02** 
     
Adequacy of governing board .01* -.00 .01 .01 
     
Transactions with trustees .04*** .00 .03*** .04*** 
     
Note: Pearson’s r correlations are reported. Figures rounded to two decimal places. Based on 
20,180 observations. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Sequence index plot of the possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 722 charities that triggered this 
exception at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure 2. Sequence index plot of poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 498 charities that triggered this 
exception at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
